Abstract Understanding cross-sectoral impacts is important in developing appropriate adaptation strategies to climate change, since such insight builds the capacity of decision-makers to understand the full extent of climate change vulnerability, rather than viewing single sectors in isolation. A regional integrated assessment model that captures interactions between six sectors (agriculture, forests, biodiversity, water, coasts and urban) was used to investigate impacts resulting from a wide range of climate and socio-economic scenarios. Results show that Europe will be significantly influenced by these possible future changes with between 79 and 91 % of indicator-scenario combinations found to be statistically significantly different from the baseline. Urban development increases in most scenarios across Europe due to increases in population and sometimes GDP. This has an indirect influence on the number Climatic Change (2015) of people affected by a 1 in 100 year flood which increases in western and northern Europe. Changes in other land uses (intensive farming, extensive farming, forests and unmanaged land) vary depending on the scenario, but food production generally increases across Europe at the expense of forest area and unmanaged land to satisfy increasing food demand. Biodiversity vulnerability and water exploitation both increase in southern and Eastern Europe due to direct effects from climate and indirect effects from changes in land use and irrigation water use. The results highlight the importance of considering non-climatic pressures and cross-sectoral interactions to fully capture climate change impacts at the regional scale.
Introduction
Numerous models have been developed and applied to study climate change impacts on specific sectors at a range of scales, for example, agriculture (Lobell et al. 2006; Soussana et al. 2010) , forestry (Bergh et al. 2003; Rasche et al. 2013) , biodiversity (Harrison et al. 2008; Keith et al. 2008) , water (Lehner et al. 2006; Alcamo et al. 2007 ) and coasts (Nicholls and Tol 2006) . However, most models treat each sector independently thereby ignoring important feedbacks and interactions across sectors. Cross-sectoral interactions are important since changes in one sector can affect another sector either directly, e.g. changes in land use affect regional hydrology or biodiversity, or indirectly through policy, e.g. measures designed for coastal flood defence also impact on coastal habitat (Holman et al. 2008a, b) . Ignoring cross-sectoral interactions can lead to either over-or under-estimation of climate change impacts and the need for adaptation in limiting societal vulnerability (Carter et al. 2007 ). Yet in spite of this only a few climate impact studies adopt a cross-sectoral approach.
At the global scale, Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) (e.g. van Vuuren et al. 2011 ), often combined with computable general equilibrium (CGE) models (e.g. Hertel 2011), have been used to project impacts across a range of sectors in climate change assessments. IAMs and CGE models have acknowledged strengths in providing comprehensive cross-sectoral analyses, but have been criticized for the simplistic way in which they represent some processes as well as having a lack of spatial differentiation (Rounsevell et al. 2013 ). CGE models, for example, are based on sectors rather than geographic space and are rarely resolved below the level of world regions or countries. Busch (2006) demonstrated the large divergence between IAMs and regional scale models in scenario studies of land use change in Europe. Even the direction of change was found to be considerably different with, for example, IAMs projecting increases in cropland areas, but regional scale models projecting decreases (Busch 2006) .
However, understanding global environmental changes requires understanding phenomena that are intrinsically regional within an integrated framework (Hibbard and Janetos 2013) . Although there are many published regional integrated assessment studies, there are relatively few that link impact models across sectors (e.g. Rounsevell et al. 2006 -agriculture and biodiversity; Kirshen et al. 2008 -multiple urban infrastructure types ; Xiong et al. 2010; Barthel et al. 2012 -water and agriculture; Baruffi et al. 2012 -surface and groundwater resources) and fewer still that both integrate between multiple sectors and consider climate and socio-economic change together (e.g. Holman et al. 2005 Holman et al. , 2008a Harrison et al. 2013) .
Climate change impacts will interact with those associated with continuing socio-economic changes, in potentially complex, non-additive ways. Since the future is unknown, scenario analysis is often used in climate change assessments to account for alternative, future socioeconomic development pathways and their implications for climate change (Rounsevell and Metzger 2010) . Scenarios encapsulate the uncertainties associated with social and political changes that are impossible to foresee through a series of 'what if?' experiments that explore plausible, i.e. not impossible, future states of the world or a region. However, the scenario approach itself can introduce other uncertainties deriving from the limits to knowledge, personal judgement (including beliefs and axiomatic preconceptions), and the quantification of scenarios with models (Rounsevell and Metzger 2010) . Whilst such limitations are known, scenarios still offer a tractable and enriching approach to explore alternative futures, especially when applied within a stakeholder, participatory context. The development of scenarios with stakeholders enables the exploitation of a wide range of tacit knowledge and experience, especially at the regional scale (e.g. Gramberger et al. this volume; Kok et al. this volume) .
This paper examines the cross-sectoral impacts of different climate and socio-economic scenarios in Europe. A regional integrated assessment (IA) model which captures interactions between six sectors (agriculture, forests, biodiversity, water, coasts and urban) is used to investigate both direct and indirect impacts resulting from different combinations of climate and socio-economic scenarios. The study aims to provide new insights into the complex interactions between different sectors under different scenario futures. It also highlights how the inclusion of non-climate pressures, in combination with climate pressures, affects the robustness of projected impacts across multiple sectors.
Methods

The CLIMSAVE IA platform
The CLIMSAVE 1 IA Platform is an interactive, exploratory, web-based tool for assessing climate change impacts and vulnerabilities on a range of sectors, including agriculture, forests, biodiversity, coasts, water resources and urban development (Harrison et al. 2013, this volume) . The Platform integrates a suite of sectoral models to simulate spatially the negative or positive effects of different climate and socio-economic scenarios on these sectors across Europe, allowing the evaluation of cross-sectoral benefits, conflicts and trade-offs. A metamodelling approach was used based on computationally efficient or reduced-form models that emulate the performance of more complex models ). This approach allowed more cross-sectoral model linkages to be built into the IA Platform as well as reducing model run-times. The Platform operates at a spatial resolution of 10 arcmin × 10 arcmin (approximately 16 km × 16 km in Europe) and produces outputs of both sector-based impact indicators and ecosystem services in order to link climate change impacts directly to human well-being.
Climate and socio-economic scenarios
The CLIMSAVE IA Platform incorporates a range of climate and socio-economic scenarios that can be selected either independently or in combination for two future time slices (either the 2020s or 2050s). This allows exploration of how impacts and cross-sectoral interactions change for different scenario combinations.
Climate scenarios
The climate change scenarios are based on the IPCC SRES emissions scenarios (A1b, A2, B1 or B2), a range of climate sensitivities (low, medium or high) and a number of global climate models (GCMs). Five GCMs are included within the IA Platform chosen using an objective method to represent as much uncertainty as possible arising from between-GCM differences (MPEH5, CSMK3, HadGEM, GFCM21 and IPCM4) (see Dubrovsky et al. this volume for further details).
Projections of Europe-wide, area-average, temperature change range from 1.1 to 4.9°C in winter and from 1.0 to 3.6°C in summer in the 2050s. Projections for precipitation change range from increases of between 1.1 and 12.5 % in winter and decreases of between 2.0 and 29.5 % in summer (see Online Resource 1 for further details). The spatial pattern of temperature and precipitation changes differs according to the GCM (see Online Resource 2).
Socio-economic scenarios
The CLIMSAVE IA Platform contains four socio-economic scenarios that were developed by stakeholders in three participatory scenario workshops (see Gramberger et al. this volume) . A participatory approach was used in order to obtain stakeholder buy-in to the modelling system by enabling stakeholders to explore futures that are of direct interest to themselves. The scenario logic was structured along two dimensions: "Economic Development" and "Solutions by Innovation". The scenarios cover a range of drivers including social, economic, cultural, institutional and political developments in a set of integrated future outlooks (Kok et al. this volume) .
The most prosperous future scenario, combining high levels of innovation and gradual economic development is We are the World (WRW); where effective governments change the focus from GDP to well-being, which leads to a redistribution of wealth, and thus to less inequality and more (global) cooperation. By contrast, governments in the Icarus scenario focus on short-term policy planning, which combined with a gradually stagnating economy, leads to the disintegration of the social fabric and to a shortage of goods and services. The Should I Stay or Should I Go (SoG) scenario is characterised by actors failing to address a rollercoaster of economic crises, which leads to an increased gap between rich and poor, to political instability and to conflicts. The Riders on the Storm (Riders) scenario is also adversely affected by continual economic crises. However, actors successfully counter this situation by investing in renewable energy and green technologies. Europe-wide changes in selected social, technological and economic drivers under these four scenarios for the 2050s are given in Online Resource 3.
Model runs and analysis
The CLIMSAVE IA Platform was run for 50 scenarios for the 2050s time slice to explore how uncertainties arising from climate and socio-economic change affect cross-sectoral impacts. The scenario combinations were categorised into three groups:
& Climate scenarios for the five GCMs combined with a low emissions scenario (B1), low climate sensitivity and baseline socio-economics (5 runs); & Climate scenarios for the five GCMs combined with a high emissions scenario (A1), high climate sensitivity and baseline socio-economics (5 runs); and & Climate scenarios (10 runs above) combined with the four socio-economic scenarios (40 runs).
Each scenario run was analysed for 11 indicators, out of the many available (see Holman et al. 2013 ), selected to cover the different sectors, viz: 1) area of artificial surfaces; 2) number of people flooded in a 1 in 100 year event (due to both coastal and fluvial flooding); 3) water exploitation index; 4) irrigation uptake; 5) biodiversity vulnerability index; 6) food production; 7) area of intensive farming; 8) area of extensive farming; 9) forest area; 10) area of unmanaged land; and 11) land use intensity index. A detailed description of these indicators is provided in Online Resource 4. Each indicator was analysed for the whole of Europe and for four catchment-based regions: northern, western, eastern and southern Europe (see map in Online Resource 5). For each combination of indicator, scenario and region, a number of summary statistics were computed from the 23,871 land grid cells: mean, median and the 5th, 25th, 75th and 95th percentiles. A paired t-test was performed on each indicator in each scenario and region to determine if it was statistically different from the baseline at a 5 % significance level.
Results
The cross-sectoral interactions simulated within the IA Platform result from the connections between the sectoral models. The majority of these are driven by changes in land use: urbanisation, particularly at the coast, can lead to increases in flood risk, and changes in agriculture can lead to an increased need for irrigation with knock-on effects for water availability for ecological flows. More generally, changing patterns in profitability for crops and timber can lead to shifts between land use classes with corresponding impacts on biodiversity and land use intensity. Within the IA Platform land use change is driven by the agricultural model which determines the relative profitability of crops on a grid cell basis; food production is prioritized and land use is allocated to ensure sufficient food (including food imports) to feed the European population (see Audsley et al. this volume) .
Cross-sectoral impacts driven by climate change only
For the runs based on just climate change scenarios, 83 % of indicators are statistically different from the baseline at the European scale (Table 1) . Those found not to be statistically different include the urban scenarios, which have no climate-driven response, many of the scenarios for food production and a single scenario for biodiversity. Many of the runs also showed significant differences from baseline at the regional scale: northern Europe is the most similar to baseline followed by western and eastern Europe, with southern Europe showing the largest changes where 91 % of indicators are statistically different to baseline. The impacts of climate change at the European scale show many overall agreements in terms of the direction of change: (i) there is no climate-related impact on urbanisation; (ii) the number of people flooded, unmanaged land, the use of irrigation and the water exploitation index increase; whilst (iii) the area of intensive agriculture, extensive agriculture and forestry decrease (Table 2 ). Only one indicator shows divergent trends at the European scale: food production varies between a very small reduction (<−5 %) and an increase (>5 %).
At the regional scale, there is less agreement in terms of the direction of change (Table 2) . Flooding increases in all regions except eastern Europe, where it slightly decreases, with differences reflecting variations in climatic patterns and sea-level rise between the scenarios. North-south differences are particularly notable for food production, with northern Europe showing gains in this indicator and intensive farming that are not seen in other regions, whilst southern Europe shows the most extreme food production losses. The area of extensive farming also varies markedly at the regional level across climate scenarios. Eastern and western Europe show increases, and northern Europe shows decreases, but the magnitudes of these changes vary considerably (e.g. changes in eastern Europe vary between +1 and +8 % depending on the climate scenario). In southern Europe, extensive farming also differs in terms of trend direction with some climates resulting in an increase (+4 %) and others an overall decrease (−8 %). Other indicators also show large differences in the magnitudes of change, particularly unmanaged land which, although increasing in all regions, varies by between 9 and 34 % in southern Europe depending on the climate scenario.
A more detailed comparison of two very different climate scenarios (IPCM4-high and GFCM21-low) helps to highlight the cross-sectoral interactions the climatic factors are driving ( Fig. 1 ; Online Resource 6). Of the two, the GFCM21 scenario is considerably hotter and drier in southern Europe, whilst the rest of Europe changes relatively moderately. Conversely, the IPCM4 scenario has considerable increases in temperature in northern and western Europe, with less change across southern and central Europe compared to GFCM21. The increase in temperature in the north in IPCM4 seems to be a key driver of change in food production, which increases in northern Europe under both climate scenarios, but increases by twice as much under IPCM4 (+151 rather than +86 from 77 kcal/grid cell at baseline). With access to new opportunities for food provision in the north, food production declines significantly in the south, but this decline is much more extreme in the IPCM4 scenario (−187 kcal IPCM4; Table 2 Minimum and maximum values of the area-average change from baseline for groups of scenarios for the 2050s. Values are presented by indicator and region for climate scenarios using baseline socio-economic values (i.e. driven by climate alone) and combined climate and socio-economic scenarios (i.e. averaged across the four socio-economic scenarios). Shaded cells are used to highlight positive (blue) and negative (red) changes in indicators. Bold outlines around cells indicate where the maximum and minimum trends are in different directions; where this is not the case the direction of the trend may be seen as robust −72 kcal GFCM21). In GFCM21, there is a need to continue to utilise traditional food provisioning areas in southern Europe in order to meet European food demand. However, the climate is considerably drier leading to a greater dependence on irrigation (+2,710 m 3 /year mean grid-cell change from baseline). This causes a consequent cross-sectoral increase in pressure on the water sector in an already water stressed region (WEI+0.25). Similar crosssectoral impacts are identified on other land use sectors: intensive farming increases in northern Europe to make the most of climatic opportunities for crops under both scenarios (but more in IPCM4), whilst forest area declines throughout all regions due to timber from current tree species becoming less profitable under climate change. Unmanaged land takes the place of these abandoned forests as well as agricultural land in the south, east and west of Europe. As intensive farming is more successful under IPCM4, extensive farming declines in Europe as a whole (−7 %), particularly in the north and south. Under GFCM21 extensive farming remains important as a source of food provision and only declines by 2 % across Europe and actually increases in southern Europe by 4 %.
Biodiversity is strongly impacted directly by climate change and indirectly by land use change. The biodiversity vulnerability index (BVI) highlights changes from baseline in terms of the number of species within a grid cell that have suitable climate and habitat. The BVI is one of the most responsive indicators to climate change: the low emissions scenarios lead to lower levels of biodiversity vulnerability, and the GFCM21 and IPCM4 climate models result in the greatest vulnerability of all the climate scenarios (Online Resource 7). However, the way in which vulnerability is manifest is different. For all scenarios, except the high emissions IPCM4, the median value and the 25th percentile are both zero indicating that at least 25 % of the grid cells show no change in terms of the total number of vulnerable species. However, in the IPCM4 scenario, the 25th percentile is zero and the median suggests that for over 50 % of grid cells the BVI is greater than 0.2 (reflecting that 20 % of species no longer have suitable climate-habitat space). Interestingly, the GFCM21 scenario has a lower median, but more high values: 25 % of the data have a BVI>0.5. In the IPCM4 scenario, the increase in biodiversity vulnerability reflects the significant shifts in land use classes from southern to northern Europe, particularly in terms of the reduction in intensive farmland in the south which is important as a habitat for arable field margin species. In the GFCM21 scenario, the higher 75th percentile is more likely to reflect a loss of appropriate climate space as a result of the large decrease in precipitation.
3.2 Cross-sectoral impacts driven by combined climate and socio-economic change At least 79 % of indicators are statistically significantly different from the baseline for the combined climate and socio-economic scenarios (Table 1) . Icarus stands out as having the lowest proportion of indicators that are statistically different at the European and regional scales, except in northern Europe. This is due to the socio-economic changes in the Icarus scenario which compensate for some of the indicator changes resulting from climate change alone. The other three scenarios have relatively similar high levels of difference from baseline, but with regional differences. In contrast to the climate-only scenarios, northern Europe shows the most statistical differences to baseline for all, but the SoG scenario.
Combining socio-economic changes with climate changes leads to a considerable increase in the divergence between indicators in different scenarios (Table 2) . Changes in intensive and extensive farming, both of which decrease at the European scale in the climate-only scenarios, vary significantly between decreases (−6 % intensive; −8 % extensive) and increases (+27 % intensive; +5 % extensive) depending on the scenario combination. This also follows for the regions of western, eastern and southern Europe. Northern Europe, whilst varying in terms of extensive farming, only has increases in intensive farming. The amount of unmanaged land, which increased in all regions in the climate-only scenarios, now both increases and decreases depending on the scenario combination, although the majority of this variation is positive. Socio-economic changes have an influence on urbanisation, and different scenario combinations have different levels of spread in the area of urban development. This has knock-on effects in terms of the number of people flooded where maximum impacts from the scenarios increase significantly across Europe. The intensity index varies notably as a result of changes in land use, and the biodiversity index both increases and decreases in many regions relative to the climate-only range (for example, in southern Europe the BVI changes from 0.2-0.4 under the climate-only scenarios to 0.1-0.5 under the combined scenarios).
The individual socio-economic scenarios lead to markedly different cross-sectoral interactions ( Figs. 1 and 2 ). Urban growth is greater in the utopian scenarios (Riders and WRW) as a result of their relatively large increases in GDP (Figs. 1a and 2a and see Online Resource 3 for the GDP values). This urban growth leads to increases in the number of people at risk from flooding. However, this risk is also strongly influenced by population change; as such SoG and Riders (with increases of 23 and 15 %, respectively) have the greatest number of people affected by flooding in terms of their 95th percentile (Fig. 2b) . The influence of urban growth on the other land use sectors (e.g. agriculture, forestry) is negligible at the European scale, especially compared to pressures placed on the food system. Such pressures are particularly evident in the dystopian SoG scenario where there is a significant increase in population and the failure of all technological innovation, which leads to a decline in water savings, irrigation efficiency and agricultural yields (see Online Resource 3). To meet food demand without agricultural innovation requires widespread conversion of land to intensive agriculture in all regions (see increases in intensive farming and the land use intensity index in Fig. 1g and k, respectively). As a result food production increases in this scenario (Figs. 1f and 2e ), but this leads to trade-offs with other sectors such as extensive farming, forestry and unmanaged land (Figs. 1h, i, j and 2f and g) which decrease considerably as the demand for food makes it more profitable to use all land for intensive agriculture; this also leads to large increases in the land use intensity index (Fig. 1k) . Nevertheless, whilst the median value for food provision in SoG is higher than the other socio-economic scenarios (Fig. 2e) , its value for the 95th percentile is notably lower than the two utopian scenarios (Riders and WRW). This is because without the high yields attained by innovation, grid cells under SoG are limited in terms of the maximum amount of food they can produce, further necessitating agricultural expansion.
By contrast, the utopian scenario WRW, has significant shifts in dietary preference away from space-intensive meat consumption and lower population increases (see Online Resource 3), which leads to less extensive farming (for livestock), particularly in western Europe (Fig. 1  h) . This causes an expansion in unmanaged land as land is no longer needed for agricultural purposes and is taken out of management (Figs. 1j and 2g) . The other dystopian scenario, Icarus, has land use changes that are more similar to the utopian scenarios than to SoG, due to a declining population (−9 %) reducing pressure on the food system. Both utopian scenarios use more irrigation compared to the baseline and the dystopian socio-economic scenarios, particularly in eastern Europe (Fig. 1d) . This is because increases in irrigation efficiency in the utopian scenarios make irrigation a more cost-effective method for maintaining agricultural production. Whilst this increase in water use might be expected to lead to a cross-sectoral impact on the water sector (an increase in the water exploitation index, WEI), innovation success in terms of water saving technology and behavioural changes to reduce domestic, power and industrial water use actually reduces the WEI relative to a situation with climate change and baseline socio-economics in all regions, with the exception of Riders in eastern Europe (Fig. 1c) . The dystopian scenarios, where these innovations are absent, both have increased pressure in terms of water exploitation, particularly in the east.
It is notable that forest area declines in northern, southern and western Europe in all scenarios and only slightly increases in eastern Europe in Riders, WRW and Icarus ( Fig. 1i ; Online Resource 7). The decline in forest area results from a number of factors. Firstly, profitability: in some scenarios, particularly those as extreme as SoG, forest land is simply not as profitable as agricultural land; in these scenarios trees are replaced by agriculture. Secondly, CO 2 increase: timber yield increases due to increasing levels of CO 2 . This means that less forest area is required to produce the same amount of timber. As such, profitability is affected and the amount of land required for forests declines. Thirdly, climatic suitability: some areas change in terms of their climatic suitability for the currently planted species. In these cases, the land use no longer remains forest and is classified as unmanaged land. A combination between these three factors drives the decline in European forests seen in the majority of scenarios. Adaptation options, such as planting more climate-appropriate trees, were not included in this study, but would provide opportunities for forest expansion (see Dunford et al. 2014) .
As the socio-economic scenarios significantly shift the patterns of land use and habitats across Europe they have significant cross-sectoral implications for biodiversity. The BVI has the broadest range of values under WRW: it has both the highest and the lowest vulnerability in terms of the 5th and 95th percentiles (Fig. 2d) . Conversely, SoG has the least vulnerability in terms of the 95th percentile, but also the least improvement in vulnerability in terms of the 5th percentile.
The strong influence of both climate and socio-economics was expected as biodiversity vulnerability reflects the output of bioclimatic envelope modelling combined with habitat masks from the land use allocation model. Vulnerability increases wherever the climate becomes unsuitable or the appropriate habitat for a species is lost. Thus, SoG's drive towards food production provides positive benefits in terms of broadening the area of Europe with habitat for species associated with arable farming, such as those relying on cereal field margins. This is partly at the expense of species associated with forests as is shown by the 95th percentile of vulnerability in northern Europe being greater than for any other scenario (Online Resource 7). In contrast, the WRW scenario has significant land use shifts towards unmanaged land at the expense of both agriculture and forestry, which leads to high biodiversity vulnerability because of the species selected within the index.
The index is based on a group of 12 species selected to represent a cross-section of European species from different taxa, regions and habitats, but there is a focus on species associated with arable and forest land uses to highlight the effects of cross-sectoral influences (see Online Resource 4). Whilst the choice of these species influences the results, it is clear that changes in land use are likely to have significant impacts on species that are under threat from climate change. The reduction in vulnerability in northern Europe compared to increases in vulnerability elsewhere reflects many of the selected species gaining climate space in the north for warmer and sometimes wetter scenarios. The north may, therefore, present opportunities for some of the more mobile threatened southern species.
Discussion and conclusions
Impacts across sectoral indicators are more robust, in terms of showing a consistent direction of change, under the climate-only scenarios compared to the combined climate and socioeconomic scenarios. Out of the 55 indicator/region combinations (Table 2) , 50 show a consistent direction of impact under the climate-only scenarios, which reduces to 28 for the combined climate and socio-economic scenarios. This concurs with previous research that has suggested that non-climatic pressures may be more significant in encompassing uncertainty ranges than climate change (Holman et al. 2005) , and highlights the importance of accounting for socio-economic change and climate change in a co-evolutionary way (Lorenzoni et al. 2000) . Adding the socio-economic scenarios to climate change also increases the range of outcomes across Europe, which demonstrates the potential for societal adaptation to reduce the severity of climate change impacts (Jäger et al. this volume) .
The study also highlights the importance of taking account of the complex interactions between different sectors under different scenario futures. The response of each sector (indicator) under the various climate and socio-economic scenarios depends on the direction, magnitude, nature (linear or non-linear) and mechanism (direct or indirect) of the effect of individual drivers on each sector, as discussed in the sensitivity analysis of the IA Platform by Kebede et al. (this volume) , and how these combine as multiple drivers within the scenarios. Drivers that affect sectors in a complex manner, particularly indirect drivers with non-linear effects, are not generally captured in sector-specific studies, which can lead to an under-or over-estimation of projected impacts (Carter et al. 2007 ). Alternatively, integrated assessments which take account of cross-sectoral interactions allow appraisal of which sectors "win" or "lose" under different scenario futures and the identification of cross-sectoral trade-offs and synergies.
Results show that cross-sectoral trade-offs and synergies vary depending on the climate and socio-economic scenario. In the SoG scenario, the agricultural sector may be categorised as a winner as all indicators related to food production increase significantly. However, this involves trade-offs with other land use sectors, such as forestry and unmanaged land, which lose considerable land, as well as the water sector which becomes increasingly stressed. Conversely, in the WRW scenario, intensive agriculture loses, but the water sector wins (becoming less stressed). The loss of arable habitat in WRW means that it shows a greater increase in biodiversity vulnerability than in the other scenarios. However, within the scenario storyline, the increases in unmanaged land are likely to compensate for this, with the ecoconscious WRW population using these areas to support biodiversity impacted by land use change. Icarus is the only scenario where there is no urban growth and there are positive changes (i.e. decreases) in the number of people flooded relative to the levels driven by climate, reflecting the declining population.
The results broadly agree with the recent IPCC review of climate change impacts for Europe (Kovats et al. 2014) , which states that climate change is expected to: (i) increase coastal and river flood risk across Europe; (ii) increase cereal yields in northern Europe, but decrease them in southern Europe; (iii) significantly reduce water availability; (iv) increase irrigation needs, but future irrigation will be constrained by reduced runoff, demand from other sectors and by economic costs; (v) increase forest productivity in northern Europe, but ecological and socio-economic damages are likely due to shifts in the range of forest tree species; and (v) cause changes in habitats and species, with local extinctions and continental scale shifts in species distributions. Kovats et al. (2014) are not, however, explicit about how cross-sectoral interactions might result in additional indirect effects and the consequences of land use change for each of these sectors. This reflects a lack of regional-scale, cross-sectoral studies in the current literature, which was the basis of the Kovats et al. (2014) study.
The work reported here has assessed impacts resulting from climate and socio-economic scenarios rather than quantifying their contribution to the vulnerability of human well-being. Whilst sectoral winners and losers were identified, the ability of society to cope with these impacts was not analysed. Dunford et al. (this volume) , however, have analysed the ability of society to cope with climate change and these results largely concur with the conclusions found here. Notably, some scenarios have greater or less vulnerability in particular sectors, but there is no combination of climate and socio-economic scenarios that leads to no vulnerability in Europe. Dunford et al. (2014) also used the CLIMSAVE IA Platform to simulate the effects of a range of different adaptation options on sectoral and cross-sectoral impacts. They found that adaptation options offer significant opportunities to decrease pressures on a range of ecosystem services, but some of these necessitate trade-offs between sectors and regions. The study also indicated that it is possible to design intelligent and creative adaptation responses that lead to win-win situations by maximising benefits and minimising any adverse crosssectoral effects.
The CLIMSAVE IA Platform is a complex network of interlinked meta-models. It requires careful exploration to identify the relationships between driver variables and output indicators. A key factor in understanding the interactions between sectors in the Platform is recognising the implicit adaptation that occurs within the land use allocation module in prioritising food production. Hence, if it is not possible to meet European food demand with the existing land use distribution, the module autonomously expands agricultural land to meet demand. This means that any driver that has an impact on food demand or agricultural production has a considerable impact on all factors dependant on land use. It also makes scenarios where food provision is de-prioritized, for example, to focus on forest products or biodiversity, harder to replicate within the Platform. Whilst further extensions of the IA Platform may re-consider the prioritisation within the land use model the current system still has considerable value. Firstly, it is still possible, with an understanding of the model system, to compensate for the priority given to food production by, for example, decreasing the proportion of food demand that is not expected to be provided by Europe's land area by increasing "food imports". Secondly, the model system underlines the importance of food security as a key issue driving the future of European land use and the pivotal importance of land use in decision-making across all natural resource sectors. This is highlighted by the projected decreases in forest areas across all scenarios, which concurs with the results of other land use scenario studies (e.g. Rounsevell et al. 2006 ) that suggest that changes in forest areas largely result from changes in other land uses, such as agriculture.
The quantification of the socio-economic scenarios within the CLIMSAVE IA Platform involved defining a single (default) value, as well as a credible range of values, for each of the socio-economic drivers by stakeholders and the model developers. For example, the default value of population change in WRW is +5 %, whilst the credible range varies from −5 to + 15 %. The scenario analysis reported here focuses on the default values for each socio-economic storyline in an attempt to highlight the key differences between the scenarios. Uncertainty related to the full range of driver values associated with both the socio-economic and climate change scenarios is explored in Brown et al. (this volume) . This probabilistic uncertainty assessment found considerable overlap, and hence convergence, across scenarios at the European scale. This is largely consistent with the results presented here in that similar outcomes can arise from different scenario runs. However, the results also show a range of individual indicator responses to the multiple scenarios that are complex and difficult to interpret, and hence understanding why convergent behaviour is observed in practice is challenging.
The new climate and socio-economic scenarios associated with the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) and the Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs) (Moss et al. 2010) , were not available at the time of this analysis. However, it is possible to reconcile the earlier scenarios used here with the new scenario framework. Van Vuuren and Carter (2014) suggest that an SRES B1 world is analogous to RCP4.5 and SSP1, B2 (or A1b) to RCP6.0 and SSP2, and A2 to RCP8.5 and SSP3. Furthermore, a simple mapping of the CLIMSAVE socio-economic scenarios to the SSPs suggests that WRW most closely matches SSP1, Icarus with SSP3, Riders with SSP4, and SoG with SSP5. It is likely that the IA Platform will be updated to include the RCPs and SSPs in the future once these have been downscaled to Europe.
The scenario analysis undertaken in this study highlights the overwhelming importance of considering cross-sectoral interactions. The results show that none of the combined climate and socio-economic scenarios have positive impacts across all sectoral indicators, in all regions of Europe and that situations in which all sectors are winners are difficult to envisage and possibly impossible to achieve in practice. Adaptation may offer opportunities to reduce and compensate for some of these cross-sectoral impacts as discussed in Jäger et al. (this volume) and Dunford et al. (2014) . However, it is clear that the many contrasting demands of the different sectors will pose considerable challenges for managers and decision-makers. This emphasises the necessity of quantifying future impacts across multiple sectors and for both climate and socio-economic change to fully capture uncertainties that can better inform the assessment of robust adaptation options.
